A High-Resolution Human Contact Network for Infectious Disease
  Transmission by Salathé, Marcel et al.
SOCIAL SCIENCES: Social Sciences
A High-Resolution Human Contact 
Network for Infectious Disease 
Transmission 
Marcel Salathé1* Maria Kazandjieva2, Jung Woo Lee2,  Philip Levis2, Marcus W. 
Feldman1 & James H. Jones3,4
1. Department of Biology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
2. Department of Computer Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
3. Department of Anthropology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
 4. Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
*Corresponding author: Marcel Salathé, Department of Biology, Stanford 
University, Serra Mall, Gilbert 116, Stanford, CA 94305-5020, Stanford, USA. 
Tel: (650) 723-6929; Fax: (650) 725-8244; E-mail: salathe@stanford.edu
Current address:
Center for Infectious Disease Dynamics, Department of Biology, Pennsylvania State 
University, University Park, PA 16802.
1
The most frequent infectious diseases in humans - and those with the highest 
potential for rapid pandemic spread – are usually transmitted via droplets 
during close proximity interactions (CPIs). Despite the importance of this 
transmission route, very little is known about the dynamic patterns of CPIs. 
Using wireless sensor network technology, we obtained high-resolution data of 
CPIs during a typical day at an American high school, permitting the 
reconstruction of the social network relevant for infectious disease transmission. 
At a 94% coverage, we collected 762,868 CPIs at a maximal distance of 3 meters 
among 788 individuals. The data revealed a high density network with typical 
small world properties and a relatively homogenous distribution of both 
interaction time and interaction partners among subjects. Computer simulations 
of the spread of an influenza-like disease on the weighted contact graph are in 
good agreement with absentee data during the most recent influenza season. 
Analysis of targeted immunization strategies suggested that contact network 
data are required to design strategies that are significantly more effective than 
random immunization. Immunization strategies based on contact network data 
were most effective at high vaccination coverage.
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INTRODUCTION
Pandemic spread of an infectious disease is one of the biggest threats to society due to 
the potentially  high mortality and high economic costs associated with such an event 
(1, 2). Understanding the dynamics of infectious disease spread through human 
communities will facilitate the development of much-needed mitigation strategies (3). 
Schools are particularly vulnerable to infectious disease spread because of the high 
frequency of close proximity  interactions (CPI) which most infectious disease 
transmission depends upon (3, 4). Infections that are transmitted predominantly  via 
the droplet route, such as influenza, common colds, whooping cough, SARS-CoV and 
many others are among the most frequent infectious diseases. Droplets from an 
infected person can reach a susceptible person in close proximity, typically  a distance 
of less than 3 meters (5, 6), making CPIs highly relevant for disease spread. However, 
very little is known about the dynamic patterns of CPIs in human communities. Here, 
we present data collected with a wireless sensor network deployment using TelosB 
motes (7) to detect  high-resolution proximity  (up to 3 meters) between subjects in a 
US high school. To our knowledge, the data set represents the first high-resolution 
temporal contact network relevant to the spread of infectious diseases via droplet 
transmission in a school.
Previous attempts to capture the contact networks relevant for infectious disease 
transmission have been based on data collection using surveys, socio-technological 
networks, and mobile devices such as cell phones. Each of these approaches has 
advantages and disadvantages. Surveys manage to capture the interactions relevant for 
disease transmission, but  are often limited by  small sample sizes (8) and are subject to 
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human error (9). Socio-technological networks can provide large, long-term data sets 
(10, 11) but fail to capture the CPIs relevant for disease transmission. The use of 
mobile devices aware of their location (or of other mobile devices in proximity) 
represents a promising third alternative. Using mobile phones to detect spatial 
proximity of subjects is possible with repeated Bluetooth scans (9) but the resolution 
is too coarse for diseases that are transmitted through the close contact route. Our 
approach is free of human error, captures the vast majority  (94%) of the community 
of interest and allows us to collect high-resolution contact network data relevant for 
infectious disease transmission. 
Most efforts to understand and mitigate the spread of pandemic diseases (influenza in 
particular) have made use of large-scale, spatially explicit models parameterized with 
data from various sources such as census data, traffic / migration data, demographic 
data etc. (3, 4, 12-15). The population is generally divided into communities of 
schools, workplaces and households, but detailed data on mixing patterns in such 
communities are scarce. In particular, very little is known about the contact networks 
in schools (16) even though schools are known to play a crucially important role in 
pandemic spread, mainly  owing to the intensity  of CPIs  at schools. In what follows, 
we describe and analyze the contact network observed at a US high school during a 
typical school day. Using an SEIR simulation model, we investigate the spread of 
influenza on the observed contact network and find that the results are in very good 
agreement with absentee data from the influenza A (H1N1) spread in the fall of 2009. 
Finally, we implement and test  various immunization strategies to evaluate their 
efficacy in reducing disease spread within the school. 
4
RESULTS
The data set covers close proximity interactions (CPIs) of 94% of the entire school 
population - 655 students, 73 teachers, 55 staff and 5 other - and contains 2,148,991 
unique close proximity records (CPR). A CPR represents one close (max. 3 meters) 
proximity detection event between two motes. An interaction is defined as a 
continuous sequence (≥ 1) of CPR between the same two motes, and a contact is the 
sum of all interactions between these two motes. Thus, a contact exists between two 
motes if there is at least one interaction between them during the day, and the duration 
of the contact is the total duration of all interactions between these two motes. 
Because the beaconing frequency  of a mote is 0.05 s-1, an interaction of length 3 (in 
CPR) corresponds to an interaction of about one minute (see Supplementary Material 
and reference therein). The entire data set consists of 762,868 interactions with a 
mean duration of 2.8 CPR (~ 1 minute), or 118,291 contacts with mean duration of 
18.1 CPR (~ 6 minutes). Figure 1a shows the frequency f(m) of interactions and 
contacts of length m (in minutes). The majority of interactions and contacts are very 
short (80th percentile of interactions at  3 CPR; 80th percentile of contacts at 15 CPR), 
and even though about 80% of the total time is spent in interactions that  are shorter 
than 5 minutes, short contacts (less than 5 minutes) represent only about 10% of the 
total time (Figure 1b).
The temporal mixing patterns observed are in accordance with the schedule of the 
school day, i.e., the average degree (number of contacts) peaks between classes and 
during lunch breaks (Figure 1c). The aggregate network for the entire day can be 
represented by a weighted, undirected graph where nodes represent individuals and 
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edges represent contacts (edges are weighted by  contact  duration). The topology of 
the contact network is an important determinant of infectious disease spread (17, 18). 
Traditional infectious disease models assume that all subjects have the same number 
of contacts, or that the contact network of subjects is described by a random graph 
with a binomial degree distribution. However, many  networks from a wide range of 
applications - including contact networks relevant for infectious disease transmission 
(19, 20) - have been found to have highly heterogeneous degree distributions. Such 
heterogeneity is important because it directly affects the basic reproductive number 
R0, a crucially  important indicator of how fast an infectious disease spreads and what 
fraction of the population will be infected. In particular, if ρ0 is the incorrect estimate 
for R0 in a heterogeneous network under the false assumption of a uniform degree 
distribution, the correct estimate is given by  R0 = ρ0 [1+(CV)2] where CV is the 
coefficient of variation of the degree (17, 21). Thus, the coefficient of variation 
quantifies the extent to which contact heterogeneity affects disease dynamics.
The descriptive statistics of the school network with different definitions of contact 
are shown in Figure 2. In order to account for the fact  that the majority  of the contacts 
are relatively  short (Figure 1a), we recalculated all statistics of the network with a 
minimum requirement for contact duration cm (i.e. all edges with weight < cm are 
removed from the graph). The network exhibits typical “small world” properties (22) 
such as a relatively  high transitivity (also known as clustering coefficient, which 
measures the ratio of triangles to connected triplets) and short average path length for 
all values of cm. Assortativity, the tendency of nodes to associate with similar nodes 
with respect to a given property (23), was measured with respect  to degree and role of 
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the person (i.e. student, teacher, etc.). Interestingly, while both measures are relatively 
high, degree assortativity decreases while role assortativity increases with higher 
values of cm. Due to the very high density of the contact network, a giant component 
exists for all values of cm. Community structure (or modularity) is relatively  high, 
increasingly  so with higher values of cm, indicating that more intense contacts tend to 
occur more often in subgroups and less often between such groups (24). We find a 
very homogenous degree distribution with the squared coefficient of variation of the 
degree distribution (CV)2 = 0.118 for the full network, and slightly increased 
heterogeneity in the network with higher cutoff values cm (Figure 2j). The 
distributions of number of interactions c and the strength s, the weighted equivalent of 
the degree (25) are equally homogenous (Figure 3). Overall, the data suggest that the 
network topology is best described by a low variance small world network. 
To understand infectious disease dynamics at the school, we used an SEIR simulation 
model (parameterized with data from influenza outbreaks, see Methods for details) 
where an index case becomes infected outside the school on a random day during the 
week, and disease transmission at the school occurs during weekdays on the full 
contact network as described by the collected data. Each individual is chosen as an 
index case for 1000 simulation runs, resulting in a total of 788,000 epidemic 
simulation runs. This simulation setting represents a base scenario where a single 
infectious case introduces the disease into the school population. In reality, multiple 
introductions are to be expected if a disease spreads through a population, but the base 
scenario used here allows us to quantify the predictive power of graph-based 
properties of individuals on epidemic outcomes. We assume that symptomatic 
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individuals remove themselves from the school population after a few hours. We find 
that in 67.7% of all simulations, no secondary  infections occur and thus there is no 
outbreak, whereas in the remaining 32.3% of the simulations, outbreaks occur with an 
average attack rate of 3.87% (all simulations: 1.33%; maximum 46.19%), and the 
average R0, measured as the number of secondary  infections caused by the index case, 
is 3.85 (all simulations: 1.24; maximum 18). Absentee data from the school during the 
fall of 2009 (i.e. during the second wave of H1N1 influenza in the northern 
hemisphere) are in good agreement with simulation data generated by the SEIR model 
running on the contact network (Figure 4a).
A strong correlation exists between the size of an outbreak caused by index case 
individual i and the strength of the node representing individual i (r2 = 0.929). The 
correlation between outbreak size and degree is substantially weaker (r2 = 0.525) 
because at the high temporal resolution of the data set, the degree contains many short 
duration contacts whose impact on epidemic spread is minimal. To estimate the 
sampling rate at which degree has maximal predictive power, we systematically  sub-
sampled our original data set to yield lower resolution data sets. Figure 4b shows that 
sampling as infrequently as every 100 minutes would have resulted in the same 
predictive power for degree as sampling every 20 seconds, while the maximum 
predictive power for degree would have been attained at ~ 20 minutes. At this 
sampling rate, the 95% confidence intervals for the correlation between degree and 
outbreak size and the correlation between strength and outbreak size start to overlap 
(due to the high correlation between degree and strength, blue line in Figure 4a). 
These results suggest that  high resolution sampling of network properties such as the 
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degree of nodes might be highly  misleading for prediction purposes if used in 
isolation (i.e. without the temporal information that allows for weighing). 
To mitigate epidemic spread, targeted immunization interventions or social distancing 
interventions aim to prevent disease transmission from person to person. Finding the 
best immunization strategy is of great  interest if only incomplete immunization is 
possible, as is often the case at the beginning of the spread of a novel virus. In recent 
years, the idea of protecting individuals based on their position in the contact network 
has received considerable attention (11, 26, 27). Graph-based properties such as node 
degree, node betweenness centrality (28), etc. have been proposed to help  identify 
target nodes for control strategies such as vaccination, but due to the lack of empirical 
contact data on closed networks relevant for the spread of influenza-like diseases, 
such strategies could only be tested on purely theoretical networks (or on 
approximations from other empirical social networks that did not measure CPIs 
directly  (11)). To understand the effect of partial vaccination, we measured outbreak 
size for three different levels of vaccination coverage (5%, 10% and 20%) and a 
number of different control strategies based on node degree, node strength, 
betweenness centrality, closeness centrality and eigenvector centrality (so called 
“graph-based strategies”). In addition, we tested vaccination strategies that do not 
require contact network data (random vaccination, preferential vaccination for 
teachers and preferential vaccination for students, see Methods). In order to ensure 
robustness of the results to variation in transmission probabilities, all simulations 
were tested with three different transmission probabilities (see Methods). Figure 4c 
shows which strategies led to significantly (p < 0.05, two-sided Wilcoxon test) 
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different outcomes at all transmission probability values. As expected, all strategies 
managed to significantly reduce the final size of the epidemic. Compared to the 
random strategy, graph-based strategies had an effect only  at higher vaccination 
coverage. Graph-based strategies did not differ much in their efficacy; in general, 
strength-based strategies were the most effective. Overall, two main results emerge: 
(i) in the absence of information on the contact network, all available strategies, 
including random immunization,  performed equally well. (ii) In the presence of 
information on the contact network, high resolution data supports a strength-based 
strategy, but there was no significant difference among the graph-based strategies.
DISCUSSION
In summary, we present high resolution data from the close proximity interaction 
network at a US high school during a typical school day. Notably, the month of the 
experiment (January) is associated with the second highest percentage of influenza 
cases in the US for the 1976–77 through 2008–09 influenza seasons (second only  to 
February). The data suggest that the network relevant for disease transmission is best 
described as a small world network with very  homogenous contact structure, in which 
short, repeated interactions dominate. The low values of the coefficients of variation 
in degree, strength and number of interactions (Figure 3) suggest that the assumption 
of homogeneity in traditional disease models (21) might be sufficiently realistic for 
simulating the spread of influenza-like diseases in communities such as high schools. 
Furthermore, we do not find any “fat tails” in the contact distribution of our data set, 
corroborating the notion (8) that the current focus on networks with such distributions 
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is not warranted for infectious disease spread within local communities. 
It is important to recognize the limitations of the data presented here, particularly  in 
light of the fact that transmission of influenza-like diseases also occurs via other 
routes, for example via contact with contaminated surfaces (29). Moreover, different 
pathogens as well as different strains of a particular pathogen might have different 
minimum requirements (both spatial and temporal) that need to be met for person-to-
person transmission. At present, the data capture the contact  network during a single 
day only. However, this is not an inherent short-coming of the approach presented 
here, and while there is no obvious reason to assume that the large scale structure of 
the contact network in a high school would change substantially  from day to day, 
long-term studies could address this issue in the future. Data collection at different 
schools with different demographic compositions would be helpful in clarifying if and 
how demographic compositions affect the properties of the network relevant  for 
disease transmission. Wireless sensor network technology certainly allows further 
elucidation of the contact  networks not only  at  different schools, but also in 
households, hospitals, workplaces and other community settings.
With regard to immunization strategies, our simulation results suggest that contact 
network data is necessary to design strategies that are significantly more effective 
than random immunization in order to minimize the number of cases at the school 
caused by a single index case. Great care needs to be taken in interpreting these 
results, for various reasons. First, the limitations of the data as discussed above mean 
that these results may not hold in other settings, underlining the need for further 
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empirical network studies. Second, the simulations assume neither multiple 
introductions nor ongoing interactions of participants outside of the school. To what 
extent these assumptions, particularly the latter, are violated when a disease spreads 
through a community  is unknown and remains to be measured. Third, and perhaps 
most importantly, a particular immunization strategy may be optimal for reducing the 
number of cases in one particular school, but may at the same time not be optimal 
from the perspective of an entire community. Immunization strategies must also take 
into account medical, social and ethical aspects (30). Thus, while we believe that data 
of the kind reported here can help inform public health decisions, in particular as 
more data become available in the future, it is clear that at this stage one cannot derive 
public health recommendations directly from this study. We note, however, that our 
findings support the notion that graph-based immunization strategies could in 
principle help mitigate disease outbreaks (11, 27).
METHODS
On January 14th 2010, we distributed wireless senor network motes (TelosB (7)) to all 
students, teachers and staff at an American high school (the date was chosen because 
it represented a typical school day). Participants were asked to sign an assent form on 
which they  also indicated at what time the mote was turned on. The assent form also 
asked participants to indicate their role/status at the school, with the following four 
options available: “student”, “teacher”, “staff”, and “other”. At the end of the day, we 
collected the motes and assent forms, and obtained data with the corresponding assent 
from 789 motes / individuals. Some of the motes had not been used (due to people 
either being absent from the school, or not  participating in the project), and for some 
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motes with data we did not obtain written assent to use the data. The remaining data 
cover 94% of the entire school population. We also deployed motes at fixed locations 
(stationary motes), but these are not part of the data set described here except for one 
stationary mote in the main cafeteria – the signal of this mote was used to reconstruct 
the global timestamp (see below). For technical details of the deployment, see 
Supplementary Material.
Epidemic Simulations
To simulate the spread of an influenza-like illness (ILI), we used an SEIR simulation 
model parameterized with data from influenza outbreaks (12, 31, 32). In the 
following, we describe the model in detail.
Transmission occurs exclusively along the contacts of the graph as collected at the 
school. Each individual (i.e. node of the network) can be in one of four classes: 
Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, and Recovered. Barring vaccination, all individuals 
are initially susceptible (see further below for more information on vaccination). At a 
random time step  during the first week of the simulation, an individual is chosen as 
the index case and its status is set to exposed. A simulation is stopped after the 
number of both exposed and infectious individuals has gone back to 0, i.e. all infected 
individuals have recovered. Each time step represents 12 hours and is divided into day 
time and night  time. Transmission can occur only  during day time, and only on 
weekdays (i.e. apart from the initial infection of the index case, we do not consider 
any transmission outside of the school – while this assumption will not hold in reality, 
it allows us to focus exclusively  on within-school transmission and to analyze the 
spread of a disease starting from a single infected case).
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Transmission of disease from an infectious to a susceptible individual occurs with 
probability  0.003 per 20 seconds of contact (the interval between two beacons). This 
value has been chosen because it approximates the time-dependant attack rate 
observed in an outbreak of influenza aboard a commercial airliner (31). In particular, 
the probability of transmission per time step (12 hours) from an infectious individual 
to a susceptible individual is 1 - (1-0.003)w  where w is the weight of the contact edge 
(in CPR). Upon infection, an individual will move into the exposed class (infected but 
not infectious). After the incubation period, an exposed individual will become 
symptomatic and move into the infectious class. The incubation period distribution is 
modeled by a right-shifted Weibull distribution with a fixed offset of half a day 
(power parameter 2.21 and scale parameter 1.10, see (12)). On the half day that the 
individual becomes infectious, the duration of all contacts of the infectious individual 
is reduced by  75%. This reduction ensures that  if an individual becomes symptomatic 
and starts to feel ill during a school day, social contacts are reduced and the individual 
leaves the school or is dismissed from school after a few hours. In the following days, 
all contacts are reduced by 100% until recovery  (i.e. the individual stays at home). 
Once an individual is infectious, recovery  occurs with a probability of 1-0.95t per 
time step, where t represents the number of time steps spent in the infectious state (in 
line with data from an outbreak of H1N1 at a New York City School (32)). After 12 
days in the infectious class, an individual will recover if recovery hasn’t occured 
before. 
We assume that all exposed individuals developed symptoms. High incidence of 
14
asymptomatic spread may affect infectious disease dynamics (33), but  reports of 
asymptomatic individuals excreting high levels of influenza virus are rare (34). In 
addition, a recent community-based study  investigating naturally acquired influenza 
virus infections found that only 14% of infections with detectable shedding at TR-
PCR (reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction) were asymptomatic, and viral 
shedding was low in these cases (35), suggesting that the asymptomatic transmission 
plays a minor role. Similar patterns were observed for SARS-CoV, another virus with 
the potential for rapid pandemic spread: asymptomatic cases were infrequent, and 
lack of transmission from asymptomatic cases was observed in several countries with 
SARS outbreaks (36).
Vaccination
The efficacy of vaccination strategies was tested by simulation. Vaccination occurs (if 
it occurs at all) before introduction of the disease by the index case. Vaccinated 
individuals are moved directly into the recovering class. We assume that the vaccine 
provides full protection during an epidemic. 
Three vaccination strategies are implemented that do not require measuring graph- 
based properties – these strategies are called “random”, “students” and “teachers”.
Random: Individuals are chosen randomly until vaccination coverage is reached. 
Students: Students only are chosen randomly until vaccination coverage is reached.
Teachers: Teachers only  are chosen randomly until vaccination coverage is reached If 
that vaccination coverage is so high that all teachers get vaccinated before the 
coverage is reached, then the strategy  continues as student strategy (see above) for the 
remaining vaccinations.
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Three vaccination strategies are implemented that do require measuring graph 
properties – these strategies are called “degree”, “strength” and “betweenness”. 
Degree: Individuals are ranked according to their degree (i.e. number of contacts 
during the day of measurement). Individuals are then chosen according to that ranking 
(in descending order) until vaccination coverage is reached.
Strength: Individuals are ranked according to their strength (i.e. total time exposed to 
others during the day  of measurement). Individuals are then chosen according to that 
ranking (in descending order) until vaccination coverage is reached.
Betweenness: Individuals are ranked according to their betweenness centrality (see 
formula below). Individuals are then chosen according to that ranking (in descending 
order) until vaccination coverage is reached. Betweenness centrality CB(i) of 
individual i is calculated as 
CB (i) =
σ st (i)
σ sts≠ t≠ i
∑
where s, t and i are distinct individuals in the contact graph, σst is the total number of 
shortest paths between nodes s and t, and σst(i) is the number of those shortest paths 
that go through node i (28). The shortest path is calculated using inverse weights.
Closeness: Individuals are ranked according to their closeness centrality  (see formula 
below). Individuals are then chosen according to that ranking (in descending order) 
until vaccination coverage is reached. Closeness centrality CC(i) of individual i is 
calculated as 
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CC (i) =
n −1
dsi
s≠ i
∑
where s and i are distinct individuals in the contact graph, dsi is the shortest path 
between nodes s and i, and n is the number of individuals in the graph (28). The 
shortest path is calculated using inverse weights.
Eigenvector: Individuals are ranked according to their eigenvector centrality. 
Calculation of eigenvector centrality is described in (37) through application of the 
pagerank algorithm with jumping probability  0. The measure captures the fraction of 
time that a random walk would spend at a given vertex during an infinite amount of 
time.
We tested three different levels of vaccination coverage: 5%, 10%, and 20%. These 
percentages apply to the entire population, i.e. a 10% vaccination coverage means that 
10% of the entire school population is vaccinated, independent of the particular 
vaccination strategy (except for strategy “none”, which means no vaccinations occur). 
In addition to the default transmission probability per CPR interval described above 
(i.e. 0.003), we also tested lower (0.002) and higher (0.0045) transmission probability 
values.
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FIGURE LEGENDS
Figure 1
(a) Normalized frequency f(m) of interactions and contacts of duration m (in minutes) 
on a log-log scale and (b) percentage p of total time of all CPIs by interactions and 
contacts with a minimum duration cm (in minutes). Most CPI time is spent in medium 
duration contacts consisting of repeated, short interactions. (c) Temporal dynamics of 
the average number of contacts (degree). Here, the degree of an individual is 
measured as the number of other individuals in close proximity  during 5 minutes. 
Gray background spans the 2.5% and 97.5% percentile of the degree distribution.
Figure 2
Various statistics on the contact graph with minimum contact duration cm (i.e. the 
leftmost point in each panel represents the full contact graph, the rightmost point 
represents the contact  graph that contains only contacts that are at least 60 minutes 
long). With increasing cm, nodes drop out of the network if they have no contact that 
satisfies the minimum duration condition (hence the reduction in number V of nodes 
in (a)). (b) Density of the graph ( 2E / (V*(V-1) ) ) where E is the number of edges, (c) 
average degree, (d) average strength where strength of a node is the total number of 
CPR of the node, (e) transitivity (i.e. cluster coefficient) as defined in (25) and 
expected value (mean degree / V) in random network (dashed line), (f) average path 
length, (g) assortativity  (23) with respect to degree (black) and with respect to role 
(red), (h) size of the largest component as a fraction of total network size, (i) 
modularity Q as defined in (38), (j) square of coefficient of variation of degree, CV2.
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Figure 3
Distribution and squared coefficient of variation of (a) degree d, (b) number of 
interactions c and (c) strength s, based on the full contact network and colored by role 
of individuals. 
Figure 4
(a) Absentee data (red) and data generated by the SEIR model (gray; 1000 runs with 
R0>1 shown). Gray lines show frequency of infectious individuals, f(I), red line 
shows the combined frequency of students who reported - or were diagnosed with - a 
fever and teachers who were absent (gap in the line due to weekend). (b) Correlation 
(r2) between outbreak size and degree of index case (black), outbreak size and 
strength of index case (red), and degree and strength of index case (blue) at various 
sampling rates. The leftmost correlations are based on the full data set (sampling 
interval 1/3 minute), all others are based on sub-sampled data sets that would have 
been generated with the given sampling interval. Shaded area behind line shows 95% 
confidence interval of correlation. (c) Differences in effect  of vaccination strategies. 
10,000 simulations for each combination of vaccination strategy, vaccination 
coverage and transmission probability  (see Methods) with a random index case per 
simulation were recorded (i.e. the panel represents a total of 810,000 simulations). 
Colors represent vaccination coverage 5% (orange), 10% (blue) and 20% (gray). A 
point at the intersection of strategy A and strategy  B indicated that between those 
strategies, there was a significant difference (p < 0.05 two-sided  Wilcoxon test) in the 
outbreak size at all transmission probability values at the given vaccination coverage. 
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A black horizontal or vertical line points in the direction of the strategy that resulted 
in smaller outbreak sizes. Due to the symmetry of the grid, data points below the left 
bottom – top right diagonal line are not shown.
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Data Collection
Deployment Details
Motes were distributed in batches (with an average of about 11 motes) the night 
before the deployment and handed out to participants starting around 6am (with the 
vast majority of participants receiving and activating their mote upon arrival at 8am). 
Participants were asked to put their mote in a thin plastic pouch attached to a lanyard 
(provided by us) and wear the lanyard around the neck, with the mote being located in 
front of the chest at all times. The participants handed the motes back to us when 
leaving the school or at  the end of the school day (the vast majority were received 
between 4pm and 4:30 pm). The technical details regarding code design, signal 
strength considerations and other issues have been described elsewhere (1), but 
briefly, each participant’s mote was programmed to broadcast beacons at -16.9 dBm 
at a regular 20-second interval; the packet included the sender’s local sequence 
number. Upon receiving a beacon, the mote checked the RSSI value (Received Signal 
Strength Indicator) of the packet. Note that the motes are always scanning, so no 
interactions of at least 20 seconds duration will be missed. If the signal strength was 
lower than -80 dBm, the packet was discarded (this decision was based on 
experimental data showing that when subjects were facing each other, packets within 
3 meters had RSSI of roughly -80 or above; packets sent when one subject was facing 
the other person’s back had a lower RSSI (1) – see also Figure S1). Otherwise, the 
receiver created a contact entry, consisting of the sender’s ID and beacon sequence 
number, as well as the local mote’s sequence number and the RSSI value of the 
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packet. 
TelosB motes have a 1 MB flash memory  where interactions can be stored, thus 
eliminating the need to broadcast interactions to any other external hardware for 
storage. As a consequence, interactions between subjects can be captured anywhere 
on the campus of the school, an area of more than 45,000 square meters.
Reconstructing the full contact network required a global timestamp, relative to which 
all interactions between subjects occurred. Local sequence numbers in each data trace 
acted as relative clocks, and they could be used as offsets from one stationary mote 
(the “master stationary mote”, located in the main cafeteria), which would be the 
master clock providing global time. Packets originating from this mote were 
transmitted at high power (-11 dBm) and were not subject to RSSI filtering at the 
receiver. More than 90% of mobile motes had received one or more beacons from the 
master stationary mote. For these mobile motes, we calculated the offset between the 
master and the local sequence numbers. In addition, we created a table of offsets to 
serve as a lookup table which included mobile motes as well as other stationary 
motes. To process data traces from mobile motes that did not hear directly  from the 
master stationary mote, we used the offsets table to transitively  compute a timestamp 
from another mote that already had its global time.
After processing the raw data, we thus obtained a list of interactions in the format
id1   id2  number_of_beacons  global_timestamp
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 The list contains 762,868 unique interactions between motes id1 and id2, for a 
duration of number_of_beacons consecutive beacon intervals starting at time 
global_timestamp. Since beacons are broadcast every 20 seconds, the number of 
beacons can be used as an approximate measure of contact  duration (such that 
duration in minutes ~ number_of_beacons/3).
This project was approved by the Stanford Institutional Review Board (IRB) on July 
24th 2009.
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FIGURE LEGENDS
Figure S1: Dependency of signal strength on distance (1, 2, 3 and 4 meters), 
orientation (forward or backward) and angle (0, 45, 90 and 135 degrees). The black 
horizontal line shows the threshold value that was chosen for the data collection. In 
(a), points show the average signal strength and the bars represent the standard 
deviation of a particular measurement. Some settings lack data because no packets 
were received. (A slight  horizontal offset was added to the data points for visual 
clarity.) Panel (b) shows the spatial setting of the 4 angles and two directions, with 
reference to the main mote.
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